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Although there is increasing recognition that theory and practice in science are often inseparably 
intertwined,  discussions  of  scientific  controversies  often  continue to  focus  on theory,  and not 
practice or methodologies. As a contribution to constructing a framework towards understanding 
controversies  linked  to  scientific  practices,  we  introduce  the  notion  of  borrowed  epistemic  
credibility (BEC), to describe the situation in which scientists exploit fallacious similarities between 
accepted tenets  in  other  fields  to garner  support  for  a  given position in  their  own field.  Our  
proposal  is  based  on  the  analysis  of  a  recent  controversy  in  phylogeography,  a  biological  
subdiscipline concerned with the study of the historical  causes of variation in genetic diversity 
within  species  in  concrete  biogeographical  locations.  Through a  review of  the arguments  that 
support the two conflicting phylogeographic schools, we show that ‘theory’ plays essentially no 
role as  a  foundation of  the controversy,  whereas both sides borrow epistemic credibility  from 
sources such as formal logic, similarity of results to those in other scientific areas, the authority of  
prominent scientists, or the presumed superiority of quantitative vs. verbal reasoning. Our case 
study underscores the indivisibility of theory and practice and provide a means to re-examine 
important  philosophical  issues  such  as  the  meaning  of  inference,  rationality,  justification,  and 
objectivity in scientific practice.
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1. Introduction
As scientists turn increasingly to computer simulations and statistical inferences to support their 
research  agendas,  many  recent  scientific  controversies  are  centered  on  practical  rather  than 
theoretical  issues.  From  a  philosophy  of  science  perspective,  this  feature  of  contemporary 
scientific research has been noticed by Winsberg, who claims that in computer simulation studies 
any underlying theory is just one of the many factors involved in the outcome of the simulations 
and, as a consequence, theoretical knowledge may bear no direct substantive relationship to the 
knowledge generated by the simulation (see Winsberg 1999, 2006, 2010). Removal from theory is 
likewise far in the case of statistical  inferences, because the generation of results is left in the 
hands of tests that were not developed for dealing with the specific situation being studied. With 
the ever more frequent use of simulations and statistical inferences, practical controversies are 
certain to be ever more frequent.
Nevertheless,  many  philosophers  of  science  still  treat  scientific  controversies  as  though  they 
mostly occurred at the theoretical level. For example, in a frequently cited study, McMullin (1987) 
called theoretical disputes "the commonest source of controversy in science" (p. 66). With a similar 
emphasis  on  theory,  Dietrich  and  Skipper  (2007)  treated  ways  in  which  scientists  exploit  
underdetermination to favor particular views by "playing off the multidimensional framework of 
theory evaluation" (p. 295). Although studies of disputes at the theory level are important, placing 
so  much  emphasis  on  theories  may  obscure  that  most  controversies  are  likely  linked  to  the 
interpretation of results obtained by means of methodologies, modeling tools, and other similar 
resources –in short, with scientific practice.
In  this  paper  we  present  the  case  of  a  scientific  controversy  taking  place  at  the  level  of  
methodologies where two competing groups in the field of phylogeography apparently debate on 
what is the better inference tool for their field. We say apparently because philosophical analysis  
shows that this practical controversy centers not so much on the methods themselves but on the 
issues they embody. Here we will  give an example of how scientists address a methodological 
controversy not by appealing to theory but instead to an array of extratheoretical considerations. 
 
In contrast  to other metascientific analyses that have often highlighted how scientists  refer to 
epistemic virtues such as simplicity, predictive power, or internal coherence to choose between 
competing theoretical alternatives (for a review see Pournari 2008, Nola and Sankey 2007, Quine 
and Ullan 1978 ), in our case study, epistemic virtues alone have not been appealed to. Instead,  
competing  authors  are  predominantly  searching  for  what  we  call  epistemic  credibility.  In  the 
context  we  analyze  here,  epistemic  credibility  is  a  means  to  justify  a  practice  in  one field  by 
appealing to a set of values, norms, virtues or practices that are considered as the signature of  
good science in similar fields. Because scientists seek to transfer merits of acceptance effective in  
other fields to their own, we refer to the borrowing of epistemic credibility. We claim that the idea 
of  borrowed epistemic credibility (BEC) is useful to understand how a scientific controversy that 
could  seem  to  be  a  simple  disagreement  over  fine  points  of  method  in  fact  embodies  deep 
disagreements over what constitutes acceptable scientific practice. 
 
We illustrate the role of BEC in a controversy currently taking place within a sub discipline of  
evolutionary biology called phylogeography. Phylogeography has been described by one of its main 
proponents as a geography-based bridge between phylogenetics and population genetics (Avise 
2009; see also Hickerson et al. 2010), provides an outstanding example of an area heavily driven by  
methodologies, in many cases computer programs with ever-increasing degrees of sophistication 
(e.g. Posada and Crandall 2001). As a case study, phylogeography is ideal for our purposes, because 
theory has only been marginally involved in the specifics of the conflict between the two main 
stances  currently  dominating  the  field,  with  scientists  instead  largely  borrowing  epistemic 
credibility from resources that do not belong to phylogeography per se. The current controversy 
within phylogeography is also ideal for illustrating the distinct way in which BEC is used,  vis-à-vis 
the more widely acknowledged role of epistemic virtues.
Borrowed epistemic credibility (BEC)
The basic idea of borrowed epistemic credibility (BEC) is that for a number of reasons, there are 
cases  in  which  scientists  cannot  appeal  to  empirical  arguments  to  justify  their  theories, 
methodologies, or even their results and consequently they must appeal to other non-empirical 
elements. In our case study, scientists appeal to a large set of elements that may include epistemic  
virtues but also norms, values, practices, and other factors considered important in their field or in 
similar areas of research. The elements that scientists select for these sets are important because 
they  represent  what  the  members  of  the  field  mean  by  objectivity,  rationality,  or  other 
considerations that a given community takes as the standards of ‘good scientific practice’. Usually, 
scientists seek to justify their theories, methodologies, or results by connecting them in some way 
with these sets of considerations. In the case of phylogeography, where the debate has centered 
on  methodologies,  scientists  defending rival  methodologies  can appeal  to  epistemic  credibility 
coming from ecology,  population  genetics,  biogeography or  molecular  biology,  to  name some 
examples. We will call phylogeography the target field, whereas ecology, population genetics, and 
molecular biology will be called the source fields. Methodologies coming from the target field need 
not exhibit the elements borrowed from the source fields. The key point of our analytical proposal  
is  that,  when  borrowing  credibility,  scientists  construct  rhetorical  devices  to  claim that  if  the 
defended methodology resembles in any sense of the term methodologies, theories, models or 
results coming from the source fields, then these should somehow also exhibit the virtues of the  
target  fields.  According  to  our  analysis,  when  the  defended  methodology  has  successfully 
borrowed  epistemic  credibility  from  the  source  fields,  it  has  also  been  effectively  –though 
artificially– endowed  with  virtues  that  in  turn  justify  the  results  obtained  with  those 
methodologies.
An issue concerning  virtues is worth clarifying at this point. In the context of this paper, we will  
speak of virtues when making reference to the members of a set formed by epistemic virtues,  
norms, practices, tacit knowledge and other elements associated to what a particular community 
regards as objective, scientific, rational, and in general, what it takes to be the standards of ‘good 
science’. Second, epistemic credibility is not borrowed from an abstract set of elements but from 
prestigious work or from prestigious individuals whose work could be seen as exemplifying some 
important virtue. For example, if A is a prestigious scientific research coming from a source field 
and B is a work in search of credibility, and if it can be said that somehow there is a similarity  
between A and B,  then borrowing epistemic credibility  amounts  to saying that  if  A and B are 
comparable, then B also exhibits A’s virtues, which in turn justifies that members of the community 
accept B. Note that the burden of proof for B lies entirely on the argument constructed around the 
borrowing of epistemic credibility. As a result, we claim that borrowing epistemic credibility should  
be viewed as a fallacy because if B truly had the imputed virtues, then the comparison with A 
would  serve  to  highlight  B’s  particular  virtues,  and  therefore  B  would  not  need  to  borrow 
credibility–epistemic or otherwise– from elsewhere.
The similarities invoked between scientific research A and B can be of different types. For example, 
robustness can be considered one type. B borrows epistemic credibility in virtue of its results being 
the same or analogous to those obtained in A. Another category is bootstrapping, in which the 
results in B are not the same but resemble the kind of results generated by A. Appeals to logical  
inference may also be a kind of borrowed credibility, when B’s results are justified because they 
conform to a notion of logical inference represented by A. In a similar way, quantification might be 
regarded as another kind of borrowed credibility, when quantitative results in A are presented as 
superior to qualitative ones obtained elsewhere. In evolutionary biology, this is a very important 
source of epistemic credibility given that much research has traditionally been qualitative. In the 
case of phylogeography, one controversial method earned its popularity in being the first available 
quantitative  method.  Finally,  epistemic  credibility  may  also  be  obtained  from sources  such  as 
tradition or appeals to the authority of prominent scientists whereby the results obtained using a  
certain methodology are justified because an expert or a group of individuals regarded as experts 
in their field back a given methodology. This is only a short list of possible sources of epistemic  
credibility, but it could be argued that the same strategy can be used to justify theories, models, or  
hypotheses. In what follows, we will show how phylogeography illustrates biologists’ deployment 
of BEC to advance their positions.
Before developing our philosophical analysis, we briefly introduce the basics of phylogeography 
through a review of the centerpiece of phylogeographic  theory  –the so-called  coalescent– and 
illustrate how this otherwise important theoretical component has no say in the current debate. 
Then, we discuss more specifically the current controversy surrounding a specific phylogeographic 
method called nested clade phylogeographic analysis (NCPA) and illustrate how a controversy that 
is  apparently  restricted  to  details  of  methodologies  in  fact  reflects  different  points  of  view 
regarding how science is to be carried out –that is, regarding scientific practice. We then argue that 
phylogeographic theory is a bystander in the phylogeographic controversy, and that the arguments 
in this controversy largely rest on different sources of BEC.
2. Genetics and geography: the basic goals of phylogeography 
Phylogeography was born in the late 1980s as an attempt to unify the fields of phylogenetics and 
population biology in an explicitly geographical context. The discipline was christened in a 1987 
paper (Avise et al. 1987; see also Avise 2009; Hickerson et al., 2010) in which the authors stated  
that  “…  (a)  phylogenetic  interrelationships  among  [segments  of  DNA]  and  (b)  geographic 
distributions  of  the phylogenetic  groupings… constitute concerns of  a  discipline that  might  be 
termed intraspecific  phylogeography.” (pp.  516-517).  Defined this way,  phylogeographic studies 
take ways of thinking about the evolutionary relationships between species, known as phylogeny,  
and apply them within species; the 'geography' suffix alludes to the role of the analysis of the 
spatial distribution of genetic variation. Empirical phylogeographic studies start with the gathering 
of DNA sequence data from as many individuals and from as many populations as possible from 
the species of  interest.  These data are  then analyzed with a  variety of  algorithms to sort  the 
samples into groups via similarity criteria (Avise 2009, Posada and Crandall 2001; Woolley et al. 
2008).  Once a hypothesis  of  the relationships between the populations of  a  species has been 
reconstructed, it is then possible to assess the distribution of genetic variation with respect to 
geography. For example, Avise (1992) detailed a case in which a suite of coastal animals including 
horseshoe  crabs,  oysters,  sparrows,  sea  bass,  and  a  species  of  coastal  turtle,  all  with  ranges 
spanning both the Atlantic coast as well as the US portion of the Gulf of Mexico, showed strong 
divergence in genetic variants between the Gulf and the Atlantic. The authors found that, in all of  
these species, the populations in the Gulf shared more similarities with the other Gulf populations 
than with those in the Atlantic and vice versa. The associations between geography and genetics 
are used to make causal inferences regarding the relative role of "recurrent processes,” such as  
continual genetic interchange, as opposed to unique events such as the rising of a mountain range 
(Fig. 1). 
Although the goals of phylogeographic studies are similar,  there are marked differences in the 
methods used. Before treating in more detail the current debate in phylogeography, we show how 
the methods-driven nature of the field leads to controversies that take place at a remove of theory. 
To that end, we briefly review the key theoretical element of phylogeography generally referred to 
as the coalescent. 
3. The coalescent
The theory of coalescence was developed independently by Kingman (1982), Hudson (1983), and 
Tajima (1983) with the aim of tracing present day genetic lineages back in time to their most recent 
common ancestor. Coalescence is the reverse of divergence: as we move forward in time, we can 
think of an individual DNA molecule replicating and siring two new lineages, an event called a 
divergence. Looking backward in time, whenever two lineages merge into the same ancestor, we 
say that they “coalesce.” Coalescent theory translates this intuition of coalescence into a series of 
idealized mathematical models whose main goal is to calculate the time elapsed between the most 
recent common ancestor and the genetic variants found in present day populations. Given the 
highly idealized nature of the models, scientists modify some of the premises of the coalescent 
model  to  approximate  results  from  real-life  populations.  For  example,  coalescent  times  are 
expected to be much longer for genetic loci that recombine than for those that do not (McVean 
and Cardin 2005). Basic versions of the coalescent assume that all members of a population are  
equally  fit,  a  condition  never  observed  in  nature.  In  response,  variation  in  factors  such  as  
survivorship or fecundity is included in the model (O’Fallon et.al. 2010). By the same token, levels 
of  genetic  diversity  can  be  taken into  account  in  calculating  population  size,  wherein  a  small  
population with high genetic diversity could be considered as representing more individuals in a 
genetic  sense  than  a  very  large  but  genetically  uniform  population  (Nei  and  Takahata  1993).  
Similarly, different mutation rates will also be associated with different coalescence times ceteris  
paribus. All of these modifications are introduced to make the models as close to the actual world 
as possible, but as models become more realistic, the resulting algorithms become less tractable as 
the number of possible evolutionary scenarios that can be depicted increases enormously with 
each new variable (e.g. McVean and Cardin 2005). It is in this context that methods that apply the  
coalescent to phylogeography proliferate, as each emphasizes different combinations of realism, 
generality, and inferential power. In the next section we will review the controversy that has arisen 
between the two most popular of such methods.
4. Coalescent theory in nested clade phylogeographic analysis versus the approximate Bayesian 
computation approach
Nested  clade  phylogeographic  analysis  (NCPA)  is  the  brainchild  of  American  geneticist  Alan 
Templeton (Templeton 1987, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2010a; Templeton et al. 1995) and is  
widely considered to be the most popular phylogeographic method (Petit 2008a, 2008b). NCPA 
starts with the sequencing of DNA regions from samples from throughout the range of a given 
species  and  estimating  their  genealogical  relationships.  The  resulting  branching  diagrams  are 
known as 'haplotype networks' (Fig. 2)1.  The "nested clade" aspect of NCPA refers to a step in 
which the haplotypes are arranged into a nested hierarchy of groups that are separated by one or 
more mutations2. The procedure then calculates by null-hypothesis testing a pair of indices that 
reflect expectations regarding how widely haplotypes are distributed, how abundant they are, and 
how far they have moved historically. Significantly large or small indices are taken as indicating 
processes such as geographical range expansion or shifts in the center of distribution. To interpret 
the indices, Templeton et al. (1995) provide an inference key that forms the basis for all  NCPA 
studies. The inferences drawn with the key are supposed to be deductive consequences of what 
should  obtain  given  the  general  expectations  of  coalescent  theory.  The  idea  is  that  different 
scenarios, e.g. panmixia, restricted gene flow with isolation by distance, sudden range expansion, 
long-distance dispersal, or events that divide one large population in two, should produce differing 
patterns of significance of the main NCPA indices (see Templeton 2009a, 2009b). 
Detractors  of  NCPA charge  that  phylogeographic  inferences  are  best  evaluated  by  a  family  of 
Bayesian-based  statistical  models,  the  most  popular  of  which  is  called  approximate  Bayesian 
computation (ABC). To test phylogeographic hypotheses with ABC, a scientist proposes a small set 
of hypotheses that might account for the geographical distribution of genetic variation observed 
today. Given the data set, which consists of DNA sequences, the evolution of the set of samples is 
modeled  back  in  time.  Different  values  for  variables  such  as  population  size  and  subdivision, 
number of generations, mutation and migration rates, and other factors of interest, are built into 
the  model.  These  factors  influence  the  rate  of  sorting  processes,  and  thus  how  likely  two 
haplotypes are to coalesce into one. Because sorting processes are stochastic, the exact topologies 
of the genealogies in each round of modeling will often differ. By repeating the model many times, 
it is possible to see how often results support or contradict a given hypothesis (for a more detailed  
discussion  on  Bayesian  methods  see  Beaumont  et.al.  2010,  Nielsen  and  Beaumont  2009,  or 
Huelsenbeck 2001). 
4.1 The coalescent as a bystander in the controversy
Coalescent theory is reflected in very different ways in NCPA and the ABC approaches. However, 
neither side in the controversy has questioned the very different ways in which the coalescent is 
shaped  into  statistical  expectations,  e.g.  that  the  NCPA key's  assumptions  are  flawed,  or  that 
genetic lineage divergence/coalescence should not be modeled. Templeton, the author of NCPA, 
goes so far as to advocate the use of both approaches (Templeton 2009a). In general, criticism of  
NCPA is  directed at  its  statistical  aspects.  For  example,  Knowles  and Maddison’s  (2002)  major 
concern  about  this  topic  is  that,  in  their  view,  single-locus  NCPA  ignored  the  randomness 
associated with the coalescent process and the accumulation of mutations. In other words, their  
concern  has  to  do not  with  coalescent  theory,  but  with  the  statistical  error  in  the  inference. 
Knowles and Maddison (2002) ask “Does NC[P]A then fill the role desired of a flexible, statistical 
inference  procedure?”  (p.  2631)  and  answer  that  NCPA  “does  not  attempt  to  distinguish 
statistically among alternative interpretations, nor does it provide an estimate of the uncertainty in 
its conclusions.” They contend that, “for any interpretation derived from Templeton’s inference key, 
we cannot ascertain the confidence limits on the reconstructed history, whether they are so broad 
as to include many unconsidered alternatives,  or if  an alternative hypothesis  would be almost 
equally well supported by the data.” (p. 2624).
Similarly, in the most recent critique of NCPA, Panchal and Beaumont (2010) identify numerous 
problems  having  to  do  with  the  statistical  analysis  of  NCPA  but  not  with  any  underlying 
phylogeographic theory. Rather than finding errors in the way that NCPA flows from coalescent 
theory, Panchal and Beaumont follow authors such as Knowles and Maddison (2002) in asserting 
that the method suffers from high false-positive rates. Other statistical criticisms include that the 
method’s  testing  approach  cannot  distinguish  between scenarios  such as  restricted  gene flow 
caused by isolation by distance or caused by long-distance dispersal (see pp. 15-17). Regarding the 
coalescent,  they only  say that  the theory for  dating clades in NCPA is  based on the standard 
coalescent but is then applied to scenarios that explicitly do not correspond to it (p.15). Therefore,  
the only reference to coalescent theory has nothing to do with disagreements regarding the theory 
itself but with its statistical implementation. Similarly,Templeton’s worries also have everything to 
do with methodology. In a recent letter, he said that his “main objection to ABC was that it can  
produce posterior ‘probabilities’ that are not true probabilities” (Templeton 2010b: 488) and that 
“the potential  of  ABC is  currently not realized because of  serious statistical  and mathematical 
flaws” (ibid: 489). 
Remarkably, mention of theory in criticisms of NCPA only appears in Beaumont et al. (2010), a 
good eight years after the critique of Knowles and Maddison (2002), which began the controversy. 
However, the criticism of Beaumont et al. (2010) has to do not with theory but with the specific  
assumptions regarding population demographics that a given coalescent equation can apply to, 
arguing that the equation used in NCPA is too simple for the situations in which it is applied. Here 
we find no real disagreement that can be considered one of theory; the authors are not pitting  
different derivations of the coalescent against one another. Instead, they are arguing over what 
level  of  biological  realism  needs  to  be  reflected  in  the  jump  from  the  idealized  models  of 
coalescent theory to dealing with real genetic data.
 
To  us,  Panchal  and  Beaumont  and  Templeton’s  conclusions  show  that  the  controversy  in 
phylogeography has nothing to do with theory but with methodological issues of both NCPA and 
ABC. If the problem were the coalescent, discussion would be centered not on the kinds of things  
NCPA or ABC cannot do but in the things that each solves to show how one model does not follow 
from  theory  as  the  other  one  does.  Instead,  all  the  discussion  is  centered  on  the  statistical 
limitations of both modeling approaches, which is why, in the end, we can say that the coalescent 
has no saying in this debate.
 
5. The nested controversies: the sources of epistemic credibility.
Because phylogeographers spend a great deal of time discussing the pros and cons of statistical 
modeling approaches, the phylogeography debate might seem to be simply a repeat of the long 
controversy  between frequentist  and Bayesian interpretations  of  probability  (i.e.  Aldrich 2008, 
Aldrich 2002, Howie 2002, Efron 1986) in a phylogeographic context.  For example, in a recent  
review of the phylogeographic controversy, Bloomquist and collaborators say that the debate “has 
focused around two general points: (i) does single-locus and multi-locus NCPA have an inherently 
high false-positive rate and does this preclude its use? and (ii) do model-based methods or NCPA 
provide a more appropriate way to analyze phylogeographic data?” (Bloomquist 2010, 627). If the 
NCPA controversy were simply a methodological  dispute then it  would be resolved when both 
methods were rigorously tested, showing that one is more reliable than the other. However, this is  
not likely to happen any time soon because the very notions of what would constitute proof and 
the processes to generate this proof differ between the two communities. NCPA proponents lean 
toward  a  sort  of  deductivism  and  supporters  of  ABC  toward  a  more  abductive  approach. 
Templeton’s  method  carries  out  a  set  of  comparisons  between  the  observed  geographic  and 
genealogical distributions of genetic variation. The statistical outcome of NCPA is a set of yes-no 
decisions,  which  is  given  biological  meaning  in  the  context  of  the  inference  key.  ABC  instead 
compares  the  computer  modeling  of  different  evolutionary  scenarios  and  among  these  uses 
statistical evaluations to decide which seems the likeliest among the alternatives modelled. While 
none of these approaches can be unequivocally categorized in any of the typical  categories of 
inference,  they  clearly  show  different  inclinations  regarding  notions  of  satisfactory  scientific 
inference. 
Our analysis shows that the debate actually has nothing to do with quarreling interpretations of 
probability  because  competing  groups  have  never  said  that  either  null-hypothesis  testing  or 
Bayesian modeling are wrong in any statistical sense (remember that Templeton actually advocates 
using both approaches).  Given that there are also no real theoretical differences between the two 
competing groups (meaning that, as we have shown, the coalescent plays no relevant role), and 
that the controversy cannot be settled by the results  generated by the very methodologies in 
dispute, we claim the controversy actually takes place in the sources of epistemic credibility that 
have been used to defend either the NCPA or ABC approach. 
In what follows we present some examples to show how both ABC and NCPA supporters defend 
their positions not on the intrinsic value of their methodologies but on a set of extrinsic virtues. In  
doing so, phylogeographers argue that method x should be preferred because it represents what 
the members of the community (of phylogeographers, evolutionary biologists, or biostatisticians) 
take for good science.  
One of the most popular sources of epistemic credibility is what we have called logical inference,  
meaning an appeal to what each phylogeographer understands as a valid logical inference. For 
example, both sides seem to agree on Popperian falsificationism as an ideal of scientific inference. 
NCPA has been defended as a Popperian approach because it successively subjects null hypotheses 
to rejection (Templeton 2009). Templeton charges that, if the pool of all plausible hypotheses is  
considered, then successively rejecting competing hypotheses will lead to a "strong" inference (in 
the sense of Platt 1964, see also Chamberlin 1890, Beard and Kushmerick 2009). In contrast to 
NCPA, because ABC can only compare the relative fits of a small number of modeled scenarios, it  
cannot be considered strong scientific inference. The conclusion drawn is that NCPA should be 
preferred because it conforms to the rules of (some sort of) formal logic, e.g. when Templeton 
mentions that “the statistics or probabilities used to measure the goodness of fit of the models 
obey the constraints imposed by formal logic” (2010b: 6376). Supporters of ABC do not refute the 
view of Popperian falsificationism as a valid approach, and indeed seem to share it with supporters 
of  NCPA. Instead,  they accuse NCPA of  being inductive,  traditionally  presented in evolutionary 
biology as the antithesis to Popper and indeed to science (Mayr 1982), such as when Beaumont 
and Panchal (2008, p. 2564) say that "Templeton (2008) cites Popper (1959) in support of the NCPA 
approach against model-based statistical analysis. However, we would suggest that although NCPA 
consists of a large number of hypothesis tests based on permutation methods, in the end it follows 
an  inductivist  paradigm  of  trying  to  derive  a  general  explanation  directly  from  the  data…  By 
contrast to NCPA, in model-based analysis [such as the ABC approach], one model is pitted against 
another in the face of the data, and this, surely, is a more valid scientific approach” (Beaumont and 
Panchal 2008: 2564). 
Another  variant  is  disagreement  over  the  value  of  verbal  versus  quantitative  reasoning.  For 
example, Beaumont and Panchal (2008) charged that "A verbal, reasoned, argument is presented 
in Templeton et al. (1995) to justify the method, and the inferences it makes, not dissimilar in style  
and authority to the Corpus Aristotelicum. The authors of 265 papers that have used NCPA are, in a 
sense,  appealing to this  authority.  One needs to ask:  is  this  science?" (p.  2564).  Appealing to 
formal logic or to one type of reasoning as superior to another is not a derivation from theory but 
instead represents a borrowing of epistemic credibility from what phylogeographers understand as 
a valid logical inference. 
Other examples of epistemic credibility include notions of robustness, which refers to approaches 
that repeat earlier conclusions, as well as familiarity, which refers to those that produce results 
congruent with prevailing views. Examples can be found in Templeton’s critique of Fagundes’s use 
of  ABC to contrast  three different  models  of  human evolution (Templeton 2008,  2009,  2010). 
Templeton charges that one of Fagundes’s models is contrary to the prevailing notion of isolation 
by  distance  between  humans  living  in  Eurasia  and  Africa,  noting  that  “it  is  patent  that  the 
parameter values chosen by Fagundes et al. (2007) are strongly discrepant with the empirical data 
on  autosomal  coalescent  times”  (Templeton 2009,  p.  323).  Templeton invokes  robustness  and 
familiarity of the results, alluding to other controversies in evolutionary biology to show that ABC 
does not reach the conclusions generated in similar fields. Again, robustness and familiarity are not 
theoretical issues but instead discredit rival positions by showing that they are inconsistent with 
accepted results.
As a final instance, epistemic credibility is frequently borrowed from different representations of 
authority. A conspicuous example is Beaumont et al. (2010), in which 22 authors unite in a single 
paper to express their reserves regarding NCPA and their support of ABC. The message of this  
surfeit  of  authors  would  seem  to  be  that  the  endorsements  of  many  scientists  against  one 
approach implies that it is incorrect. A similar implication that solitariness is associated with the 
incorrect  position  is  when  Beaumont  and  Panchal  (2008,  p.  2563)  note  that  “there  is  a 
disagreement between Templeton (2004, 2008), who suggests the method works well, and three 
independent groups (Knowles & Maddison 2002; Petit & Grivet 2002; Panchal & Beaumont 2007), 
who believe that they have demonstrated that it  does not.  As far as we are aware, there are 
currently no publications other than those of Templeton and co-workers to support the accuracy or 
efficacy of  NCPA.”  The preceding examples are  appeals  to the authority  implied by consensus 
among many scientists.  Another  approach is  to appeal  to  the authority  of  a  single prominent 
figure, such as the statement of Knowles (2008 p. 2712), when she refers to authors who voice 
“other concerns over the validity of NCPA’s inferences.” Among these authors she cites Felsenstein 
(2004), one of the leading developers of the methods used for reconstructing the evolutionary 
relationships of organisms. Given his prominence in systematic biology, his verdict against NCPA 
would be weighty. However, in Felsenstein (2004), the only reference to NCPA we could locate was 
on p. 484: “A more statistical approach was taken by Templeton (1998), using the nested clade 
analysis tree reconstruction methods introduced earlier by Templeton et al. (1988). Although well-
defined enough  to  be  implemented by  computer  programs (Clement,  Posada,  Crandall,  2000; 
Posada, Crandall, and Templeton, 2000), these methods do not attempt to take into account the 
uncertainty  of  the  estimate  of  the  tree,  and  there  has  been  little  study  of  their  statistical  
properties. A notable exception is the paper by Knowles and Maddison (2002). Although the need 
to use manual steps in the analysis limited the number of replications they could make, they found 
that the single-tree approach was problematic.” In contrast to the assertion of Knowles (2008), 
Felsenstein does not express anything that can be construed as “other concerns” beyond what had 
already  been  discussed in  the  literature.  As  a  result,  we  can  only  interpret  Knowles’s  cite  of 
Felsenstein as an attempt to borrow credibility from his authority to shore up her position. Finally, 
supporter of ABC Petit (2008a, p. 1404) appeals to the authority of institutions when he concludes  
that “...the results of Panchal & Beaumont (2007) convince me that reputable journals should (i)  
discourage the use of the NCPA method for single locus data sets..., and (ii) still be suspicious of  
NCPA analyses based on multiple loci,” the subtle aspersion being that any journal that henceforth 
publishes an NCPA study should be held in suspicion.
We trust that with these examples of appeals to logical inference, robustness, familiarity, and to 
authority,  we have illustrated ways that scientific controversy can take place at a remove from 
theory, and that a major element of the phylogeography controversy is the borrowing of epistemic 
credibility. Moreover, our survey suggests that authors defend not only a particular methodology 
but perhaps more importantly, a vision of what phylogeography and indeed science ought to be.
6. Epistemic credibility and the theory-practice divide
Thinking of theory as standing separately from practice has a long tradition in the philosophy of 
science. As a result, philosophers of science have an extensive battery of conceptual tools at their 
disposal to think about the theory-practice relation. The vocabulary of laws and axioms, of the 
distinction between models and theories, syntactic and semantic relations to the world, as well as 
notions of theories as explanatory devices all stem from the conception of theory as being in some 
way distinct from practice. The view of theory as interacting inextricably with practice has less of a  
tradition, and because of the complexity of this view, much conceptual machinery remains to be 
built (see for example Burian 2005, Keller 2002, Rheinberger 1997, Pickering 1995). Here we offer  
the notion of  borrowed epistemic credibility (BEC), which we believe can help better understand 
how theory and practice interact to construct scientific knowledge. We hope we have convinced 
the  reader  that  scientists  do  borrow epistemic  credibility  from many  sources,  and that  these  
sources  reflect  the  relevance  of  extra-theorical  elements  in  the  construction  of  specialized 
scientific knowledge.
We  do  not  claim  that  scientific  controversies  closely  linked  to  practice  and/or  methodology 
exclusively rest on epistemic credibility. Instead, we argue that epistemic credibility is likely to plays 
an important role in controversies where empirical results alone cannot not help settle differences. 
For example, we detect indirect appeals to epistemic credibility in Dietrich and Skipper’s 2007 
account of the molecular clock controversy, in which both theoretical and atheoretical elements 
played an important role. We find a similar analytical context in Winsberg (2006, p. 2), who states 
that the credibility of a simulation model comes not only from its governing theory, but also “from 
the  antecedently  established  credentials  of  the  model  building  techniques  employed  by  the 
simulationists”. In these examples, and similar to what we have seen in phylogeography, scientists  
have had to look for arguments beyond the theory and its empirical  consequences to settle a  
theoretical  dispute  or  to  justify  particular  modeling  practices.  However,  the  elaborations  of 
Dietrich & Skipper and Winsberg  make reference to extra-theoretical elements in the context of 
epistemic  virtues  and/or  the  social  aspects  of  science  as  surrounding  theoretical  disputes;  in 
contrast,  our account and framework place BEC at the core of theoretical  disputes, not at the 
periphery.
Our framework also gives evidence of two great traditions within evolutionary biology, showing 
that this field is by no means a single unified body of thinking. For example, theory in the form of  
the coalescent may play no role in the controversy but Popperian falsificationism is often cited. 
This  is  not  a  particular  love  affair  phylogeographers  have  with  Popperianism,  but  is  instead 
included  in  a  long-lasting  relation  that  prominent  research  groups  within  systematics  and 
evolutionary biology have had with Popper’s vision of science since the 1960s. As discussed by 
Rieppel (2008; see also Stamos 1996; Helfenbein and DeSalle 2005; Faith 2005), falsification of 
hypotheses has been perceived as a crucial component of good scientific practice for decades by a 
large  number  of  systematists  and  evolutionary  biologists.  Templeton’s  borrowing  of  epistemic 
credibility  from  Popper  follows  this  tradition,  as  do  ABC  supporters,  who  do  not  attempt  to 
challenge  the Popperian ideal  but  instead try  to show how NCPA is  not  really  an  example  of  
falsificationism. In a similar way, one can trace back sources of epistemic credibility in the debate  
to other important values, norms, traditions,  or practices particular  to different schools  within 
evolutionary biology. To name some examples, different schools defend their own interpretations 
of  statistical  inference  (see  Sarkar  1992),  the  value  of  graphical  versus  mathematical 
representation  (see  Petit  2007),  or  the  value  of  graphical  versus  mathematical  reasoning 
(Beaumont et.al. 2010). Perhaps this example of an intellectual tradition within a guild of scientists 
illustrates the social dimension of knowledge (see for example Wusch 2002). From this point of 
view, normativity is a rational standard provided by a community (see Wusch 2002, chapters 8 and 
9).  Applied to our  case,  phylogeographers  in  disagreement  represent  two communities  within 
evolutionary biology that have quarreled for decades over the correct way to conceptualize their 
field, evolutionary history, and science itself. The norms and values defended by each community 
are made explicit in the sources from which epistemic credibility is borrowed by NCPA and ABC 
supporters. If this is correct, then it should be possible to reconstruct the intellectual history of 
evolutionary  biology  to  show  how  and  why  (at  least)  two  parties  emerged  and  what  their 
differences are. Perhaps such analysis could help find ways to work out the differences. 
Our study also highlights other pertinent questions of the theory-as-practice view. For example, 
science  evolves  via  a  continual  anastomosis  of  practices  and  concepts.  Phylogeography  is  an 
excellent  example,  because  it  is  a  synthetic  discipline  forged  by  the  union  of  phylogenetics, 
biogeography,  and  population  genetics.  Other  synthetic  disciplines  include  evolutionary 
developmental biology and metabolomics. If phylogeography is any guide, then it would seem that 
these fields do not emerge out of the construction of novel theory but as the pulling together in  
the laboratory of disparate research traditions. Theory, along with practice generally construed, 
may be inherited from the different fields being brought together, but it is by no means clear why 
certain elements make the step to the new field, or how theory originated within the new field is 
constructed. However, the conceptual tools that we propose here can illuminate some aspects of 
the forging of synthetic disciplines, by exposing the web of distinct elements imported from other 
fields  and  how  they  are  used  to  construct  a  new  discipline.  Again,  the  notion  of  epistemic 
credibility is vital as the new discipline imports not only theory and methodologies but– as the 
phylogeographic debate illustrates– what the members of the new community should take for 
rational, objective, or scientific.
Borrowing  epistemic  credibility  is  not  restricted  to  phylogeography.  It  is  clear  that  in  novel 
synthetic fields,  the progenitor disciplines must play an important role as the source fields for  
epistemic credibility. The clearest examples come from disciplines in which the merits of theories  
or  practices  in  general  cannot  be  evaluated  by  experimentation,  that  is,  areas  in  which  the 
experiments needed to resolve a controversy conclusively would be so difficult to carry out and 
interpret  that  scientists  must  appeal  to  other  sources  to  defend the empirical  data.  Take,  for 
example,  the case  of  the danger  theory  in  immunology  (Matzinger  1994).  Danger  theory was 
introduced to explain some of the shortcomings of the clonal selection theory, the field’s champion 
theoretical  corpus. A key distinction of danger theory has to do with the signals that turn the  
immune  system  on  and  off,  a  difference  that  should  translate  into  important  medical 
consequences most notably in cancer treatment or transplants. However clear the consequences 
of  the theory,  experiments are very difficult  to  come by as  it  is  not  clear  how to manipulate 
something as complex as the immune system to generate clear experimental results. Nonetheless, 
danger  theory  has  slowly  gained  popularity,  as  its  supporters  have  successfully  defended  it 
appealing  to  numerous  sources  of  epistemic  credibility.  For  example,  Kuhn’s  paradigms  (i.e. 
Matzinger 2007) to defend the relevance and importance of  danger theory,  informatics where 
there  are  successful  intrusion  detecting  systems  based  on  the  intuitions  provided  by  the 
immunological theory that indirectly support the notion that danger is an important element for 
any surveillance and protection mechanism (i.e. Ou 2010, Vella 2010), and to a theory of meaning  
and  reference  to  contextualize  the  problems  raised  by  the  clonal  selection  theory  and  the 
advantages of a danger theory (Matzinger 1994). 
 
7. Conclusion
The polemics surrounding NCPA illustrate how a seemingly methodological controversy is in effect 
a larger debate confronting two visions of what one scientific field should be. This larger debate is 
evident in the numerous sources of epistemic credibility borrowed by the participants and the 
scant  presence of  coalescent  theory.  From a  philosophical  perspective,  we illustrate  a  case  of 
scientific controversy that takes place largely in the realm of practices. In our analysis, the interplay  
of theory and practice-based controversies, theory evaluation using epistemic virtues, and the web 
of conceptual  relationships traced by the borrowing of epistemic credibility,  contrasts with the 
traditional conception of theory as separate from practice. Instead, our analysis adds support to 
the increasing recognition of the inseparable reciprocity between concepts and practice in science. 
Our analysis  also highlights an important social  component to the practice of science and the 
generation of knowledge. The sources of epistemic credibility invoked in this particular controversy 
are not simply rhetorical devices used to defend a particular methodology but trace the historical  
evolution  of  the  field  of  genealogical  studies  by  exposing  the  epistemic,  methodological,  and 
theoretical commitments shared by its different communities. In our reconstruction it can be seen 
how  the  controversy  transcends  the  particulars  of  ABC  versus  NCPA  to  deal  with  numerous 
fundamental disagreements in terms of the importance of gene trees, the need to automate the 
inference process, the importance of formal inferences, and in general the sources of epistemic 
credibility that justify the results of a given method. Perhaps then, this controversy is another 
chapter  in  a  long  debate  evolutionary  biologists  have  had  to  understand  better  their  field, 
evolution, and science, and shows how complex practices, in which the distinction between theory 
and practice is difficult to demarcate, begs revision of notions of the nature of explanation and 
how scientists define the appropriate structure of inferences.
 
________________________________________
Footnotes
1‘Haplotype' denotes any particular DNA variant. The DNA segments used in these studies have 
numerous positions with different states across the different individuals sampled. These states can 
be manifested as substitutions of different bases (G, A, T, or C) or by the presence or absence of a  
base at  a  given site,  known as  an insertion-deletion event  or  indel.  Different individuals  have 
different combinations of substitutions and indels. Each unique combination of states in the same 
molecule of DNA is referred to as a haplotype.    
2'Clade' is the term used to denote a phylogenetic grouping that includes an ancestor and all of its 
descendants.
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